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Abstract 
Oil and Gas Pipeline (OGP) projects face a wide range of Risk Factors (RFs) at the design, construction and operational stages of 
the project particularly because of Third Party Disturbance (TPD) in the insecure environments. The lack of risk information and 
the root causes of pipelines’ failures are hindering the efforts of managing these risks. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the 
existing risk factors and recommend an effective Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) based on a holistic approach from the prospect 
of stakeholders’ interest. An investigation was carried out to identify the critical RFs and existing RMMs in different circumstances 
to overcome the problem of the historical records about the RFs and RMMs. The findings of the literature review were used to 
design a questionnaire survey to analyze RFs and evaluate the “usability and effectiveness” of the RMMs. The RFs were ranked by 
using Risk Index (RI) method based on the probability and severity levels of each RF. The survey results revealed that sabotage and 
terrorism as part of TPD, corruption and insecure areas are the most critical RFs, whereas, anti-corrosion efforts, underground 
pipelines and technologically advanced risk monitoring systems are the most effective RMMs. These ranking are vary based on the 
occupation of the stakeholder in OGPs; like the planners and the researchers said corruption is the most critical RF, and the 
researchers said that the advance risk monitoring systems are the most effective RMM.   
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1. Introduction
Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) projects must be planned, designed, installed and operated in ways that comply with
the safety requirements. However, several risks are hindering the safety of these projects such as external sabotage, 
corrosion [1], design and construction defects, natural hazards, operational errors and more risks [2-4]. Mitigating 
OGPs’ RFs is a valuable knowledge because it minimizes the economic losses from disturbing the business of oil 
export; as well as, it ensures the safety of the projects’ stuff and the people that live near the pipelines. 
The efforts of mitigating OGPs RFs are significantly require verified historical records about the pipelines’ accidents 
and failure reasons [5,6]. Moreover, the probability of RFs must be accurately analyzed and ranked because dealing 
with each RF as the most severe risk results resources wistful. However, the existing risk analysis methods are not 
accurate enough to analyze the external sabotage of the pipelines when there is no database “historical records” about 
such risk [7-9]. Additionally, an accurate evaluation of the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in term of their degrees 
of “usability and effectiveness” degrees of mitigating the RFs helps the decision makers while they are considering 
their plans to mitigate OGPs’ RFs. Accordingly, the inaccurate analyses of OGPs’ RFs and inaccurate evaluation of 
the RMMs are hindering any efforts of risk mitigation in these projects. Particularly, in the troubled and developing 
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countries because these highlighted problems are crucial and associate with OGP projects in these countries. Hence, 
there is a vital need to help the stakeholders to improve the safety for these projects by providing the required data for 
OGPs risk management such as the “probability and severity” levels of the RFs and the “usability and effectiveness” 
of the RMMs. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the RFs and evaluate the RMMs in OGPs projects more holistically and 
effectively base on qualitative documents analysis and a questionnaire survey. Moreover, the up-to-date data about the 
RFs and RMMs can help the stakeholders to improve the safety of GOPs continuously. 
Iraq is selected as the case study in this paper because its oil reserves is the fifth-largest oil reserves in the world 
[10]. As well as, it are estimated that Iraq’s gas reserves are amongst 10th to 13th largest reserves globally, in addition 
to vast potential reserves for further discoveries [11]. At the present time, a vast range of RFs threatens OGPs project 
in Iraq and the inadequacy of mitigating the RFs hinders the business of oil export which is in high demand after 2003.  
Moving forward in this paper, section 2 consists a review about identifying pipelines’ RFs and RMMs. Section 3 
explains the research methodology. The results of analyzing the RFS and evaluating RMMs are interpreted in section 
4. Section 5 discusses this paper’ findings. Finally, section 6 shows the conclusions. 
 
2. Identifying the Risk Factors (RFs) and Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in OGPs Projects 
Qualitative documents analysis were carried out to identify the RFs in OGPs projects in different circumstances, 
especially in the insecure countries. Thirty RFs were identified based on the findings of the literature review that are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. The identified RFs in OGPs projects from the literature review. 
RFs Author 
Thieves 12 
Publics’ legal and moral awareness about OGPs projects 7 
Peoples’ education and poverty levels in OGPs areas 12 
Leakage of sensitive information 13 
Threats to staff  14 
Sabotage and Terrorism  12 
Accessibility of pipelines 15 
Conflict over land ownership 16 
Insecure areas 15 
Vehicle accidents 7 
Animal accidents 17 
Geological RFs 18 
Lack of regular inspections and maintenance of OGPs 12 
The opportunity to sabotage exposed pipelines “aboveground pipelines” 14 
Lack of compliance with the safety regulations 18 
Weather conditions and natural disasters  12 
Inadequate risk management approaches 12 
Non-availability of warning signs 12 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the RFs 12 
Corrosion and lack of anti-corrosive action 12 
Shortage of modern IT services 12 
Design, construction and material defects 18 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control systems 15 
Operational errors   12 
Corruption 12 
Few researchers about this problem 12 
Lawlessness 7 
Lack of proper training schemes 12 
No proper attention from the stakeholders 12 
Lack of historical records and data about RFs  12 
 
These wide investigations helped to overcome the problem of data scarcity about the RFs in OGPs projects in Iraq. 
Accordingly, a number of RMMs was suggested to mitigate RFs like anti-corrosion and cathodic protection; laying the 
pipelines underground rather than aboveground; modern equipment to monitor the RFs; proper inspection and 
maintenance; proper training for the stuff  about mitigation the RFs in their projects; avoid insecure areas; anti-terrorism 
planning and design; avoid the registered RFs; protective barriers; government-public cooperation; and warning signs 
near the pipelines and marker tape above the pipeline. 
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Table 1 cannot give accurate information about the “probability and severity” of the RFs. As well as, the suggested 
RMMs need to be evaluated regarding their degrees of “usability and effectiveness” to mitigate the RFs in OGPs 
projects. Therefore, the filed investigations were required to analyze the contents of OGPs’ safety in Iraq by distributing 
a questionnaire survey.  
3.  Methodology  
An industry-wide questionnaire survey was designed based on the findings of the literature review (see Table 1) in 
order to analyze the RFs based on the perceptions of the stakeholders in OGPs in Iraq. In this survey, the RMMs will 
be evaluated too. The respondents were promised that the data will be anonymity analyzed. 
The first question was asked about the occupation of the respondents in OGPs projects. The survey had two questions 
to analyze the RFs as follows.  The first question was addressed to analyze the probability of occurrence of the 30 RFs 
on a five-point rating Likert scales which is “rare, unlikely, possible, likely and almost certain”. The second question 
was analyze to evaluate the severity of the RFs on a scale “negligible, minor, moderate, major and catastrophic”. 
Similarly, the survey had two questions to evaluate the RMMs as follows. The first question was asked about evaluating 
the usability of the RMMs on a scale “rare, unlikely, possible, likely and almost certain”. The second question was 
about evaluating the effectiveness of RMMs on a scale “ineffective, slightly effective, moderately effective, very 
effective, and extremely effective”.  
The descriptive statistical analysis in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used to 
determine the values of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) for each RF by calculating the mean of the five 
point Likert scales. The degree of impact for each RF was found by using Risk Index (RI) method as explained in Eq. 
(1) [19]. The RFs were ranked regarding their RI values. In the same way, the usability and the effectiveness of the 
RMMs were found.  
 
 𝑅𝐼 = (𝑅𝑃 × 𝑅𝑆)/5                                                                                                                                                       (1) 
4.  Results  
The survey was distributed online and it was targeting the owners, clients, researchers, consultants, planners, 
designers, and construction, operators, maintenance workers in Iraq’s OGPs projects. 198 respondents from 
stakeholders have answered the survey’s questions as shown in  
 
Fig. 1: Participants’ demographic information. 
 
Fig 1. As shown in Fig. 1, the majority of the participants were members of construction teams, followed by the 
operators, owners or clients, researchers or students and the less majority was for the consultants, planners and 
designers.  
The Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient factor was calculated to measure the reliability level of the survey 
[20,21]. Commonly 0.7 indicates a minimum level of reliability [22]. Table 2 shows the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
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factor case processing summary. The reliability test is not applicable for question 1 because it was asking about the 
participants’ occupation in OGPs projects.  
Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient factor case processing summary for the survey overall and by participants' occupation. 
Case Processing Summary Valid % Items α 
All the questionnaire’s questions 100 95 0.910 
The question about RP (survey overall) 100 30 0.919 
The question about RS (survey overall) 100 30 0.863 
The question about the usability of RMMs (survey overall) 100 12 0.867 
The question about the effectiveness of RMMs (survey overall) 100 12 0.792 
a consultant, planner or designer 100.0 95 0.863 
a member of a construction team 100.0 95 0.892 
an operator 100.0 95 0.927 
an owner or client 100.0 95 0.917 
a researcher or student 100.0 95 0.899 
 
Based on the occupations of the stakeholder in OGPs projects in Iraq, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 show the results 
of calculating the RP, RS and RI of each RF respectively. Table 6 shows the ranking of the RFs based on their values 
of RI. The usability and effectiveness of the RMMs are shown in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. Please note in these 
tables means the whole participants; (I) means the consultants, planners and designers; (II) means the construction 
workers; (III) means the operation and maintenance workers; (IV) means the owner and client; and (V) means the 
researchers. 
Table 3. The probability of the risk factors by participants' occupation. 
RFs (Risk Probability) RP 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  3.995 3.357 3.958 4.195 4.000 4.091 
Corruption  3.980 4.000 3.986 3.878 3.846 4.242 
Insecure areas  3.717 3.286 3.634 3.805 3.769 3.909 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.712 4.000 3.761 3.561 3.513 3.909 
Thieves  3.692 3.214 3.845 3.659 3.564 3.758 
Corrosion & lack protection against it  3.687 3.429 3.648 3.390 3.795 4.121 
Improper safety regulations  3.687 3.643 3.662 3.561 3.872 3.697 
Exposed pipelines  3.667 3.429 3.437 3.854 3.897 3.758 
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  3.667 3.643 3.592 3.585 3.615 4.000 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.657 3.571 3.606 3.537 3.769 3.818 
Lack of proper training  3.646 3.571 3.761 3.439 3.462 3.909 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  3.631 3.571 3.577 3.561 3.692 3.788 
The pipeline is easy to access  3.631 3.571 3.563 3.732 3.538 3.788 
Limited warning signs  3.626 3.429 3.648 3.341 3.974 3.606 
Little researches on this topic  3.621 3.429 3.789 3.366 3.359 3.970 
Lawlessness  3.606 3.786 3.676 3.268 3.795 3.576 
Lack of risk registration  3.566 3.214 3.606 3.390 3.615 3.788 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention  3.530 3.286 3.676 3.439 3.462 3.515 
Conflicts over land ownership  3.495 3.571 3.451 3.659 3.667 3.152 
Public’s poverty & education level  3.449 3.357 3.521 3.439 3.256 3.576 
Design, construction & material defects  3.333 2.429 3.254 3.293 3.385 3.879 
Threats to staff   3.323 2.714 3.394 3.268 3.410 3.394 
Inadequate risk management  3.227 2.929 3.183 2.976 3.436 3.515 
Operational errors  3.101 2.857 3.042 2.878 3.205 3.485 
Leakage of sensitive information  2.980 2.643 3.070 2.707 2.949 3.303 
Geological risks  2.747 2.714 2.662 2.537 2.795 3.152 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  2.652 2.429 2.606 2.537 2.692 2.939 
Vehicles accidents  2.465 2.357 2.380 2.293 2.333 3.061 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  2.237 1.929 2.268 2.024 2.179 2.636 
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Table 4: The severity of the risk factors by participants' occupation. 
 
RFs 
(Risk Severity) RS 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  4.490 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939 
Corruption  4.323 3.500 3.958 3.57 3.692 3.636 
Lawlessness  4.192 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939 
Insecure areas  4.106 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606 
Thieves  4.081 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818 
Corrosion & lack protection against it  3.990 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention  3.960 3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727 
Improper safety regulations  3.949 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667 
Improper inspection & maintenance  3.924 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  3.899 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758 
Low public legal & moral awareness  3.859 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727 
Design, construction & material defects  3.848 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333 
Lack of proper training  3.773 3.500 3.408 3.098 3.410 3.697 
Threats to staff  3.732 2.857 3.014 3.293 3.128 3.606 
Lack of risk registration  3.697 2.857 3.042 2.854 3.077 3.455 
Exposed pipelines  3.682 2.500 3.042 2.951 3.000 3.000 
Limited warning signs  3.662 2.143 2.676 2.780 2.846 2.788 
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  3.652 1.714 2.155 1.951 2.000 1.970 
The pipeline is easy to access  3.646 3.571 3.732 3.829 3.718 3.939 
Operational errors  3.611 3.500 3.958 3.537 3.692 3.636 
Conflicts over land ownership  3.611 3.286 3.732 3.512 3.769 3.939 
Little researches on this topic  3.571 3.286 3.634 3.659 4.000 3.606 
Leakage of sensitive information  3.505 3.000 3.662 3.585 3.846 3.818 
Public’s poverty & education level  3.409 3.357 3.676 3.683 3.641 3.697 
Inadequate risk management  3.399 3.143 3.577 3.829 3.692 3.727 
Geological risks  3.182 3.214 3.592 3.488 3.872 3.667 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  3.066 3.357 3.746 3.610 3.641 3.394 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  2.970 3.000 3.690 3.488 3.487 3.758 
Vehicles accidents  2.712 3.357 3.535 3.244 3.590 3.727 
Animals accidents  2.020 3.571 3.549 3.390 3.179 3.333 
Table 5. The index of the risk factors by participants' occupation. 
RFs (Risk Index) RI 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  3.587* 3.021 3.579 3.909 3.405 3.669 
Corruption  3.441 3.314 3.537 3.254 3.314 3.677 
Insecure areas  3.053 2.722 2.928 3.267 3.035 3.222 
Lawlessness  3.023 2.812 3.210 2.583 3.211 3.056 
Thieves  3.013 2.388 3.206 2.998 2.906 3.029 
Corrosion & lack protection against it  2.942 2.498 2.918 2.696 3.172 3.222 
Improper safety regulations  2.912 2.810 2.899 2.797 2.958 3.070 
Improper inspection & maintenance  2.870 2.755 2.742 2.829 3.015 3.078 
Publics’ legal and moral awareness 2.865 3.086 2.934 2.588 2.738 3.127 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  2.832 2.551 2.802 2.831 2.878 2.961 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention  2.796 2.629 2.972 2.583 2.716 2.855 
Lack of proper training  2.751 2.551 2.807 2.634 2.574 3.080 
Exposed pipelines  2.700 2.253 2.498 2.820 3.118 2.710 
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  2.678 2.446 2.641 2.641 2.633 2.958 
Limited warning signs  2.656 2.057 2.672 2.396 3.057 2.754 
The pipeline is easy to access  2.648 2.245 2.550 2.858 2.613 2.824 
Lack of risk registration  2.636 2.112 2.692 2.381 2.725 2.984 
Little researches on this topic  2.586 2.057 2.796 2.348 2.343 2.983 
Design, construction & material defects  2.566 1.839 2.410 2.538 2.760 3.033 
Conflicts over land ownership  2.524 2.398 2.586 2.641 2.670 2.139 
Threats to staff  2.481 1.900 2.687 2.312 2.518 2.468 
The education and poverty levels in OGPs areas 2.352 2.398 2.500 2.332 2.071 2.384 
Operational errors  2.240 1.837 2.185 2.008 2.482 2.556 
Inadequate risk management  2.194 2.050 2.170 1.843 2.343 2.599 
Leakage of sensitive information  2.089 1.774 2.171 1.756 2.117 2.462 
Geological risks  1.748 1.551 1.605 1.670 1.749 2.273 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  1.626 1.388 1.585 1.448 1.657 2.031 
Vehicles accidents  1.337 1.010 1.274 1.275 1.328 1.707 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  1.329 0.964 1.380 1.195 1.308 1.582 
Animals accidents  0.765 0.661 0.856 0.609 0.728 0.860 
*For example: RI for Terrorism & sabotage = 3.995 (RP from Table 3)  × 4.490 (RS from Table 4 ) = 3.587 
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Table 6: The ranking of the RFs by participants' occupation. 
RFs Ranking the RFs 
Total I II III IV V 
Terrorism & sabotage  1 3 1 1 1 2 
Corruption  2 1 2 3 2 1 
Insecure areas  3 7 7 2 7 4 
Lawlessness  4 4 3 16 3 9 
Thieves  5 15 4 4 10 11 
Corrosion & lack protection against it  6 11 8 10 4 3 
Improper safety regulations  7 5 9 9 9 8 
Improper inspection & maintenance  8 6 13 7 8 7 
Publics’ legal and moral awareness 9 2 6 14 13 5 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats  10 10 11 6 11 14 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention  11 8 5 15 15 16 
Lack of proper training  12 9 10 13 19 6 
Exposed pipelines  13 16 21 8 5 19 
Shortage of the IT services & modern equipment  14 12 17 12 17 15 
Limited warning signs  15 20 16 18 6 18 
The pipeline is easy to access  16 17 19 5 18 17 
Lack of risk registration  17 18 14 19 14 12 
Little researches on this topic  18 19 12 20 23 13 
Design, construction & material defects  19 23 22 17 12 10 
Conflicts over land ownership  20 14 18 11 16 26 
Threats to staff  21 22 15 22 20 22 
The education and poverty levels in OGPs areas 22 13 20 21 25 24 
Operational errors  23 24 23 23 21 21 
Inadequate risk management  24 21 25 24 22 20 
Leakage of sensitive information  25 25 24 25 24 23 
Geological risks  26 26 26 26 26 25 
Natural disasters & weather conditions  27 27 27 27 27 27 
Vehicles accidents  28 28 29 28 28 28 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control system  29 29 28 29 29 29 
Animals accidents  30 30 30 30 30 30 
 




Total I II III IV V 
Avoid "Insecure-Zones 3.652 2.929 3.789 3.829 3.385 3.758 
Anti-terrorism design 3.475 2.643 3.676 3.268 3.564 3.545 
Avoid the registered risks and threats 3.616 3.357 3.662 3.634 3.513 3.727 
Proper training 3.768 3.643 3.634 3.854 3.769 4.000 
Move to an underground pipeline 4.051 3.857 4.085 4.390 3.846 3.879 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection 4.247 4.000 4.282 4.512 4.103 4.121 
Protective barriers and perimeter fencing 3.783 3.214 3.732 3.878 3.872 3.909 
Warning signs and marker tape above the pipeline 3.727 3.143 3.732 3.683 3.846 3.879 
Foot and vehicles patrols 3.606 3.143 3.648 3.683 3.590 3.636 
High technology and professional remote monitoring 3.480 2.643 3.606 3.415 3.359 3.788 
Government-public cooperation 3.278 3.000 3.183 3.463 3.205 3.455 
Proper inspection, tests and maintenance 3.677 3.429 3.549 3.805 3.769 3.788 
 




Total I II III IV V 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection 4.232 3.857 4.113 4.415 4.513 4.091 
Move to an underground pipeline 4.066 3.929 4.000 4.220 4.333 3.758 
High technology & professional remote monitoring 3.995 3.643 4.070 3.878 4.000 4.121 
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance 3.828 3.429 3.887 3.829 3.872 3.818 
Proper training 3.793 3.857 3.662 3.780 3.897 3.939 
Avoid "Hot-Zones 3.778 3.214 4.014 3.659 3.744 3.697 
Anti-terrorism design 3.778 3.143 3.986 3.341 4.179 3.667 
Avoid the registered risks & threats 3.773 3.500 3.817 3.683 4.000 3.636 
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing 3.682 3.214 3.577 3.756 3.872 3.788 
Warning signs & marker tape above the pipeline 3.571 2.929 3.577 3.439 3.923 3.576 
Government-public cooperation 3.545 3.214 3.563 3.561 3.564 3.606 
Foot & vehicles patrols 3.530 3.429 3.563 3.634 3.615 3.273 
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5. Discussion  
By using the RI to rank the RFs, the overall results of the survey show that the terrorism and sabotage, corruption, 
insecure areas, lawlessness and thefts are the most critical RFs in OGPs projects in Iraq. Nevertheless, the ranking of 
the RFs is quite varied deepening on the occupations of the stakeholders. Regarding the planners, consultants and 
designers perceptions corruption, low public legal and moral awareness, sabotage actions, lawlessness and improper 
safety regulations are the top five RFs that influence the pipeline projects. The stakeholders who are working in the 
construction filed have ranked the top five of RFs as follows. Terrorism and sabotage actions, corruption, lawlessness, 
corrosion and lack protection against it, thefts and the stakeholders are not paying proper attention. The operators have 
come with different ranking as follows. Terrorism and sabotage actions, insecure areas, corruption, thefts, and the 
pipelines are easy to access. The projects’ owners and clients have said that the terrorism and sabotage actions, 
corruption, lawlessness, corrosion and lack protection against it, and the exposed “aboveground” pipelines are the top 
five RFs. The participants from the academic field indicated that corruption, terrorism and sabotage actions, corrosion 
and lack protection against it, insecure areas and low public legal and moral awareness the most critical RFs.  
Regarding evaluating the RMMs by their degree of usability, the overall results of the survey indicate anti-corrosion 
such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an underground pipeline and protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing are the RMMs with the higher chance of usability in OGP projects in Iraq. The planners, consultants and 
designers have another point of view, which is anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an 
underground pipeline, and proper training are the mitigation methods with the higher rate of usability. Anti-corrosion 
such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an underground pipeline and avoid "Insecure-Zones” are the more 
useable methods as construction said. The operators came with a different observation that is like this anti-corrosion 
such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an underground pipeline and protective barriers and perimeter 
fencing are the most useable methods. Which slightly different for the owners and clients observations that are as 
follows: the methods of the higher rate of usability are anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, 
protective barriers and perimeter fencing and move to an underground pipeline. The researchers said that the anti-
corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, proper training and protective barriers and perimeter fencing are 
the most usable risk mitigation methods.  
The result of evaluating the effectiveness of the RMMs are anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, 
move to an underground pipeline and high technology and professional remote monitoring are the most effective 
RMMs. However, move to an underground pipeline, anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection and proper 
training are the most effective RMMs as the consultants, planners and designers said. Which is different from the 
observation of the construction teams that are as follows. Anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, high 
technology and professional remote monitoring and avoid "Insecure-Zones are the most effective RMMs. The opinion 
of the operators is like that anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an underground pipeline 
and high technology and professional remote monitoring are the most effective RMMs. Which is different from the 
opinions of the owners and clients as they said anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection, move to an 
underground pipeline and anti-terrorism design are the most effective RMMs. The researchers think like that high 
technology and professional remote monitoring, anti-corrosion such as isolation and cathodic protection and proper 
training are the most effective RMMs. 
The survey results were found to be reliable as all Cronbach’s alpha coefficient factor values are above 0.7, as 
explained in Table 2. Collecting the required information from various and trusted sources such as research articles 
and stakeholders provides real information for OGPs risk management. However, it depends on the availability of such 
documents and the willingness of the stakeholders to cooperate with the authors. Analyzing the RFs and evaluating the 
RMMs based on the perceptions of the stakeholders could reduce the time and the cost of the investigations and increase 
the stakeholders’ awareness about their responsibilities regarding OGPs risk management. As well as, it helps to 
analyze OGPs RFs more realistically and to identify the positive and negative recommendations about RMMs in a way 
that ensure the continuity of pipeline security. Because the perceptions of the stakeholders are based on real experience 
about OGPs issues. Furthermore, correct sampling and representing the whole stakeholders' categories enhances the 
results of RFs analysis and RMMs evaluation.  
6. Conclusion 
There is a need for an accurate analysis of OGPs RFs because the external RFs have not been accurately analyzed 
yet. The overall results of the survey showed that the external risk factors like terrorism and sabotage, corruption, 
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insecure areas, lawlessness and thieves were found the most critical risks in OOPs projects in Iraq. Avoid "Insecure-
Zones, anti-terrorism design and avoid the registered risks and threats were found as the most usable risk mitigation 
methods. Meanwhile, anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection, move to an underground pipeline and high 
technology & professional remote monitoring were the most effective risk mitigation methods. While, regarding their 
occupations in OGPs, the stakeholders in OGPs have different perceptions about this ranking.     
This paper provided verified information about risk factor and risk mitigation methods such identifying the risk 
factors, analyzing the factors’ “probability and severity” and evaluating the “usability and the effectiveness” of the risk 
mitigation methods. Such information could the help organizations and countries that just began to mitigate OGPs risk 
factors more effectively and to provide useful recommendations for their actions and plans about OGPs risk 
management in the insecure countries such as Iraq. 
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